Nepa: Cost Base Too High to Withstand Challenging Market
Research Update
2023-05-22
07:25
Redeye argues that Nepa’s Q1 report was weak, especially with regard to the company’s cost control. There were however bright spots, and Nepa’s subscription business in Marketing Optimization still delivered decent y/y growth. While Nepa is taking actions towards reducing its cost base, Redeye is unsure whether it is enough, or if more is needed. Redeye lowers its valuation but sees a significant upside if management executes well.
JVK
FR
Jesper Von Koch
Fredrik Reuterhäll
Nepa delivered a weak quarter in a very challenging market. Total revenues declined 9% y/y, the gross margin was low (72.7% vs 80% last year), and the cost base is too high – causing a quarterly loss in Q1.
However, looking below the surface, Nepa’s core, its subscription business in Marketing Optimization (MO), delivered a solid +8.5% y/y growth. The weak figure of -1% y/y for Nepa’s full ARR was caused by weakness from the Customer Experience (CX) segment that lost one of its biggest customers.
Regarding the cost base, it is simply too high to sustain profitability in a weak market. Hence, Nepa is taking further actions to cut costs. The company aims for an annual cost base of SEK220m by Q4 2023. While this is a good step, we doubt that it will be enough, and we would have liked to see even more.
On the back of the Q1 report, Redeye lowers its estimates for sales and raises its estimates for costs, resulting in lowering our fair value range. New Base Case is SEK58 (80), Bear Case is SEK26 (38), and Bull Case is SEK100 (130).
We argue that Nepa is trading stupidly cheap. We think so both with regard to the EV/Sales multiple (0.35), the EV/ARR multiple (0.63, despite ARR only making up 55% of sales), and also in relation to its revenue quality. The reason why is the cost base being too high, causing profitability to be dependent on volatile ad-hoc sales. While we argue that the value of Nepa is much higher than today’s market value, it will require solid execution to extract it.
SEKm | 2021 | 2022 | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e |
Revenues | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Revenue Growth | 14.2% | 5.7% | -7.9% | 8.2% | 8.1% |
EBIT | 40.0 | 19.7 | -2.9 | 23.7 | 30.0 |
EBIT Margin | 13.5% | 6.3% | -1.0% | 7.6% | 8.9% |
Net Income | 38.6 | 17.5 | -3.4 | 19.5 | 24.4 |
EV/Revenue | 4.1 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 |
EV/EBIT | 30.1 | 5.1 | -40.7 | 4.6 | 3.1 |
P/E | 33.4 | 9.3 | -48.8 | 8.4 | 6.7 |
Q1 was weak. Low sales, low gross margin cost by low ad-hoc sales, and too high cost base caused a quarterly operating margin of -5%.
Net sales can be divided into two different ways: by revenue type and by segment. Regarding revenue type, around 60% is recurring subscription revenues, and the rest is divided relatively evenly between ad hoc revenues to subscription customers, and ad hocs to others. Nepa has three segments: Marketing Optimization (MO) constitutes around 80% of revenues, whereas Customer Experience (CX) and Innovation Acceleration (IA) share somewhat equally the remaining 20%.
Q1 revenues declined by 9% y/y. Subscription revenues increase by 1% y/y, ad hoc revenues to subscription customers declined by 8% y/y, while ad hocs to non-customers declined by a full 32% y/y.
Source: Nepa
The golden nugget of Nepa is its subscription business in MO, i.e., its Brand Tracking product. Revenues from this part grew by 8.5% y/y, which we think is decent considering the challenging market.
Weighing on total revenue development, the company's two other segments declined significantly y/y. CX declined by 27% and IA declined by a full 64%. The drop in CX was mainly caused by one of its biggest customers churning. IA is pure ad-hoc consulting projects that is very dependent on the market environment.
Source: Nepa
In the quarter, Nepa started to provide SaaS metrics for its subscription business. While we think this is good, we would have wanted to see the metrics for MO separately. The reason why is that we believe its SaaS metrics are strong – something that today’s share price does not give Nepa credit for.
Nepa revealed an average Net Revenue Retention (NRR) since Q1 2020 of 99.9%, and quarterly average churn of 1.0%. We are certain of MO having performed better than this, while CX has surely weighed on these numbers. Should Nepa reveal these metrics for MO separately, we think investors could better assess the quality and value of Nepa.
Looking at the y/y comparison of MO, Q1 was still OK. See below:
Source; Nepa
The gross margin in Q1 was low – landing at 72.7%, compared to last year’s 80.0%. The reason for the low gross margin was the low share of ad hoc revenues, especially within Innovation Acceleration (IA).
Source: Nepa
Nepa’s cost base stood at SEK60.5m in Q1 if including “other operating costs”, and SEK59.3m without.
Source: Nepa
With low revenues, especially from the high-margin ad hoc revenues from Innovation Acceleration, the gross profit simply was not high enough to balance the company’s high cost base. Hence, EBIT margin landed on -5% and the underlying free cash flow margin (EBITDA less investments in intangibles) was -10%. This makes it obvious that the company’s cost base is simply too high to carry.
In the Q1 report, Nepa stated the following “The previously announced cost saving programs were projected to save SEK 31.2 million of personnel costs and other external costs on an annual basis from the cost base in place before the programs, in October and November 2022. But, given the weaker than expected market in the short-term, the savings are materializing too slowly. Therefore, we are aggressively accelerating actions to fully realize the targeted cost savings and reach an annual cost base (personnel and other external costs) of SEK 220 million by Q4 2023.”
This statement surprised us in two ways. First, we had calculated the cost base after the savings to be less than SEK220m. Second, the CEO appears to insinuate that total cost savings will now exceed SEK31.2m but still results in a higher cost base than we had previously estimated.
Considering the weakness of the market, we are not sure if an annual cost base of SEK220m will be small enough. The last twelve months, the cost base has been SEK235, making the maths hard to get correct considering that Nepa appears to think cost savings of SEK31.2m is not enough.
Source: Nepa
We are still certain that Nepa has a solid core business that is worth considerably more than what is today priced in the share price. However, Nepa has put itself in an awkward position and needs to take firm action to turn its business around. While we argue that there is a substantial upside to the share price if Nepa succeeds, management needs to show that it is capable of running a stable business with profitable growth.
SEKm | 2021 | 2022 | Q1 23 | Q2 23E | Q3 23E | Q4 23E | 2023E | 2024E | 2025E | 2026E |
Total net sales | 295 | 312 | 73 | |||||||
New | 74 | 65 | 76 | 288 | 311 | 336 | 361 | |||
Old | 78 | 68 | 79 | 301 | 324 | 353 | 386 | |||
Change | -6% | -3% | -4% | -4% | -4% | -5% | -6% | |||
Gross margin | 78% | 76% | 73% | |||||||
New | 73% | 72% | 72% | 72% | 74% | 75% | 75% | |||
Old | 75% | 75% | 75% | 75% | 75% | 76% | 77% | |||
Change | -2% | -2% | -2% | -2% | -1% | -1% | -2% | |||
OPEX | 181 | 205 | 54 | |||||||
New | 51 | 45 | 49 | 198 | 192 | 206 | 220 | |||
Old | 45 | 39 | 46 | 178 | 188 | 200 | 216 | |||
Change | 13% | 14% | 8% | 11% | 2% | 3% | 2% | |||
EBITDA | 50 | 31 | -1 | |||||||
New | 3 | 3 | 5 | 10 | 38 | 46 | 51 | |||
Old | 13 | 11 | 13 | 46 | 55 | 68 | 79 | |||
Change | -81% | -76% | -59% | -78% | -30% | -32% | -36% | |||
EBIT | 40 | 20 | -4 | |||||||
New | -1 | -1 | 2 | -3 | 24 | 30 | 33 | |||
Old | 10 | 8 | 10 | 32 | 40 | 52 | 59 | |||
Change | -107% | -107% | -77% | -109% | -41% | -43% | -45% | |||
EBIT (%) | 14% | 6% | -5% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
New | -1% | -1% | 3% | -1% | 8% | 9% | 9% | |||
Old | 13% | 12% | 12% | 11% | 12% | 15% | 15% | |||
Change | -14% | -12% | -10% | -12% | -5% | -6% | -6% |
SEKm | 2021 | 2022 | Q1 23 | Q2 23E | Q3 23E | Q4 23E | 2023E | 2024E | 2025E | 2026E |
Net sales | 295 | 312 | 73 | 74 | 65 | 76 | 288 | 311 | 336 | 361 |
- Recurring | 148 | 170 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 45 | 176 | 192 | 212 | 233 |
- Ad hoc | 76 | 67 | 17 | 17 | 10 | 17 | 61 | 65 | 68 | 70 |
Gross Profit | 231 | 236 | 53 | 53 | 47 | 55 | 208 | 230 | 252 | 271 |
EBITDA | 50 | 31 | -1 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 10 | 38 | 46 | 51 |
EBIT | 40 | 20 | -4 | -1 | -1 | 2 | -3 | 24 | 30 | 33 |
EPS (SEK) | 4.9 | 2.2 | -0.6 | -0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | -0.4 | 2.5 | 3.1 | 3.3 |
Recurring as % of total | 50% | 54% | 59% | 59% | 68% | 60% | 61% | 62% | 63% | 64% |
Sales growth (%) | 14% | 6% | -9% | -15% | -6% | 0% | -8% | 8% | 8% | 7% |
- Recurring sales growth | 6% | 15% | 1% | -2% | 9% | 8% | 4% | 9% | 10% | 10% |
- Ad hoc sales growth | 29% | -12% | -8% | -16% | -1% | -10% | -10% | 7% | 5% | 3% |
EPS growth (%) | 194% | -55% | -157% | -105% | -106% | -138% | -119% | -681% | 26% | 6% |
Gross margin | 78% | 76% | 73% | 73% | 72% | 72% | 72% | 74% | 75% | 75% |
EBITDA margin (%) | 17% | 10% | -1% | 3% | 4% | 7% | 3% | 12% | 14% | 14% |
EBIT margin (%) | 14% | 6% | -5% | -1% | -1% | 3% | -1% | 8% | 9% | 9% |
Assumptions, fair value range | |||
Bear Case | Base case | Bull case | |
Value per share, SEK | 26 | 58 | 100 |
2023e-2027e | |||
Sales CAGR | 3% | 8% | 11% |
Total sales 2027 | 327 | 389 | 437 |
Avg EBIT margin | 4% | 7% | 9% |
EBIT margin 2027 | 6% | 9% | 14% |
EPS CAGR | 14% | 13% | 25% |
2027e-2031e | |||
Sales CAGR | 3% | 8% | 9% |
Average EBIT margin | 6% | 10% | 16% |
EPS CAGR | 3% | 18% | 15% |
Terminal EBIT margin | 8% | 14% | 20% |
WACC | 11.0% | 11.0% | 11.0% |
Case
Sticky, recurring software revenues with pending margin expansion
Evidence
Customers migrated to highly automated platform – scalability and pricing power
Supportive Analysis
Challenge
Scaling the business in a recession – but the company will cut cost base by almost 15%
Valuation
Scalable software priced as a poorly run consultancy
People: 4
Nepa is still run by its founder and main owner, Ulrich Boyer, who still owns 19.0% of the capital and votes in Nepa. Boyer has founded more than 10 companies (all linked to marketing) and has 20+ years of experience as a CEO. While we think Boyer does a good job as CEO, he is now 60 years old and says that he wants to step down in a few years when a good successor has been found. Thus, Nepa is only half-searching for a new CEO. However, once a new CEO is installed, Ulrich Boyer will likely return to his role as chairman of the board.
Former CEO P-O Westerlund resigned in 2021, citing personal health reasons, and still retains his 5.4% ownership stake. After initially having remained on the board of directors, Westerlund is no longer active in Nepa. The second largest owner is Elementa Fonder – a hedge fund with 17.4% of the shares. Elementa is quite active as an owner. In terms of institutional ownership, several well-known Swedish funds are found amongst owners.
Business: 4
Around 66% of Nepa’s revenues are recurring, and the remaining 33% are ad-hoc. However, customers with ongoing subscriptions occasionally order ad-hoc projects. Thus, revenues from customers with ongoing subscriptions constitute more than 80% of total revenues.
Historically, Nepa has had a very low and almost non-existent client churn. In the spring of 2020, during the outbreak of the pandemic, a few tourism-related customers paused their subscriptions. However, these customers quite quickly returned to normal subscriptions – even though their respective industries (and the companies themselves) were still severely hurt. We think this is a strong indication of the high stickiness of Nepa’s revenues.
Nepa enjoys market leadership in its core market, Sweden, where it has a ~50% market share for its core offering, i.e., its brand-tracking software. When it comes to procurements where Nepa is up against competitors, Nepa usually wins a very large percentage of these (as much as 90%, we have heard).
Nepa can grow with its customer in several dimensions – new markets, new modules, new customer groups, and new brands. The company aims to grow geographically along with its customers.
Financials: 3
Since its foundation in 2006, Nepa has had a long history of strong and consistent growth – except for 2009 and 2020, in which sales declined by 1% and 2%, respectively. 2009 was impacted by the financial crisis, whereas 2020 included Nepa completed a big restructuring program to improve profitability. Nepa has a solid sales CAGR of around 10% independent of which time period of the last ten years we measure.
Gross margin is high at almost 80% and has been slowly but steadily increasing for the last five years.
Before Nepa’s IPO in 2016, the company operated with a slightly positive EBIT margin. After the IPO, the company expanded unsuccessfully into the USA, which made Nepa unprofitable. In 2019, Nepa initiated a cost-cutting program and completed its turnaround in 2020. In 2021, profitability further improved – but mainly because Nepa didn’t invest in anything. The only focus was cutting costs and becoming a leaner organization. From 2022, investments have increased to enable platform migration and some new development. While the future profitability f looks bright, the company needs to prove its profitability for several years in order to gain a higher score.
Income statement | |||||
SEKm | 2021 | 2022 | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e |
Revenues | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Cost of Revenue | 64.1 | 76.0 | 79.4 | 80.9 | 84.1 |
Operating Expenses | 181.1 | 205.3 | 198.3 | 192.3 | 206.3 |
EBITDA | 50.3 | 30.9 | 10.0 | 38.1 | 46.1 |
Depreciation | 10.2 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Amortizations | 0.00 | 11.2 | 12.9 | 14.4 | 16.2 |
EBIT | 40.0 | 19.7 | -2.9 | 23.7 | 30.0 |
Shares in Associates | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Interest Expenses | 2.3 | 2.7 | 0.60 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Net Financial Items | 1.6 | 2.1 | 0.04 | 0.80 | 0.80 |
EBT | 41.6 | 21.8 | -2.9 | 24.5 | 30.8 |
Income Tax Expenses | 3.0 | 4.2 | 0.46 | 5.0 | 6.3 |
Net Income | 38.6 | 17.5 | -3.4 | 19.5 | 24.4 |
Balance sheet | |||||
Assets | |||||
Non-current assets | |||||
SEKm | 2021 | 2022 | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e |
Property, Plant and Equipment (Net) | 0.83 | 0.91 | 0.81 | 0.70 | 0.58 |
Goodwill | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Intangible Assets | 30.8 | 46.9 | 60.0 | 72.3 | 80.2 |
Right-of-Use Assets | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Other Non-Current Assets | 0.91 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 |
Total Non-Current Assets | 32.6 | 48.9 | 61.8 | 74.1 | 81.8 |
Current assets | |||||
SEKm | 2021 | 2022 | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e |
Inventories | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Accounts Receivable | 79.1 | 76.3 | 63.3 | 68.5 | 74.0 |
Other Current Assets | 0.00 | 22.1 | 20.1 | 18.7 | 20.2 |
Cash Equivalents | 85.1 | 63.8 | 44.5 | 54.9 | 71.8 |
Total Current Assets | 164.1 | 162.2 | 127.9 | 142.0 | 166.0 |
Total Assets | 196.7 | 211.1 | 189.8 | 216.1 | 247.8 |
Equity and Liabilities | |||||
Equity | |||||
SEKm | 2021 | 2022 | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e |
Non Controlling Interest | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Shareholder's Equity | 102.8 | 109.7 | 106.3 | 125.8 | 150.2 |
Non-current liabilities | |||||
SEKm | 2021 | 2022 | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e |
Long Term Debt | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Long Term Lease Liabilities | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Other Long Term Liabilities | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Total Non-Current Liabilities | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Current liabilities | |||||
SEKm | 2021 | 2022 | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e |
Short Term Debt | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Short Term Lease Liabilities | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Accounts Payable | 23.5 | 27.6 | 25.9 | 28.0 | 30.3 |
Other Current Liabilities | 70.4 | 73.8 | 57.5 | 62.3 | 67.3 |
Total Current Liabilities | 93.9 | 101.4 | 83.4 | 90.3 | 97.6 |
Total Liabilities and Equity | 196.7 | 211.1 | 189.8 | 216.1 | 247.8 |
Cash flow | |||||
SEKm | 2021 | 2022 | 2023e | 2024e | 2025e |
Operating Cash Flow | 2.0 | 15.9 | 6.6 | 37.0 | 40.8 |
Investing Cash Flow | -10.6 | -27.5 | -25.9 | -26.6 | -23.9 |
Financing Cash Flow | 0.00 | -9.7 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
Disclosures and disclaimers